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| Boitani, Andrea; Nicolini, Marcella; Scarpa, Carlo. |
| This paper investigates how the ownership and the procedure for the selection of firms operating in the local public transport sector affect their productivity. In order to compare different institutional regimes, we carry out a comparative analysis of 72 companies operating in large European cities. This allows us to consider firms selected either through competitive tendering or negotiated procedures. The analysis of the data on 77 European firms over the period 1997-2006 indicates that firms operate under constant returns to scale. Retrieving the residuals we obtain a measure of total factor productivity, which we regress on firm and city characteristics. We find that when firms are totally or partially in public hands their productivity is lower.... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Local Public Transport; Public Ownership; Translog Production Function; Financial Economics; C33; K23; L25; L33; L91. |
| Ano: 2010 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/59392 |
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| Engel, Eduardo M.R.A.; Fischer, Ronald; Galetovic, Alexander. |
| This paper reviews the Latin American experience with highway privatization during the last decade. Based on evidence from Argentina, Colombia and Chile, we find that private financing of new highways freed up fewer public resources than expected because public funds were often diverted to bail out franchise holders. Furthermore, many of the standard benefits of privatization did not materialize because of pervasive contract renegotiations. We argue that the disappointing performance of highway privatization in Latin America was due to two fundamental design flaws. First, countries followed a privatize now, regulate later approach. Second, most concessions were awarded as a fixed-term franchise, thereby creating a demand for guarantees and contract... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Build-operate-and-transfer (BOT); Concessions; Cost-of-funds; Flexibility; Franchising; Government subsidies; Present-value-of-revenue (PVR); Regulation; Renegotiation; Public Economics; H21; L51; L91. |
| Ano: 2003 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/28456 |
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